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Abstract 
Since EU members have agreed to establish integrated military forces and to decide jointly on their 
deployment in European institutions, the EU’s “democratic deficit” is no longer confined to issues of 
common market governance but also includes foreign, security and defense politics. Drawing on 
recent debates in peace and conflict research, I will argue that a democratic deficit in European 
security and defense politics is not only worrying for its own sake but also because a growing body 
of literature regards the democratic control of security and defense politics as the best guarantee to 
maintain peaceful and cooperative relations with other states. 
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visiting scholarship at the University of California at Berkeley in March 2007. I would like to thank 
the Institute of European Studies at Berkeley and Beverly Crawford in particular for supporting this 
work and for providing a stimulating working environment. I am grateful to Matthias Dembinski and 
Jonas Wolff for helpful comments and suggestions. 1. Introduction 
 
The past fifteen years have witnessed a lively debate about the “democratic deficit” in European 
Union politics.
2 The rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in a Danish referendum in 1992 was 
instrumental in triggering this debate because it indicated the dwindling of the “permissive 
consensus” among the citizens of the member states that had accompanied the process of European 
integration for most of its existence. Since the 1992 referendum, politicians and scholars across 
Europe (and beyond) raised concerns about a loss of democratic accountability in European politics 
because national governments have pooled and delegated some of their sovereignty in and to 
supranational institutions. As a consequence, political decisions are no longer made exclusively by 
national parliaments or governments but also by Commission officials (as in competition politics), 
by complex expert networks (as in food safety) or by ministers negotiating complex package deals 
behind closed doors.  
 
The debate on Europe’s democratic deficit has had a clear focus on the politics of common market 
governance the impact of which citizens feel most directly. In contrast, the EU’s Common Foreign, 
Security and Defense Policy has been almost entirely absent from this debate. At first glance, the 
silence on the democratic control of security policy may not be surprising for two reasons. First, the 
EU’s Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy has kept the supranational institutions at 
distance and instead remained firmly intergovernmental. As a consequence, the institutional features 
that fuel the democratic deficit in common market politics are, by and large, missing. Without 
Qualified Majority Voting and powerful supranational institutions, one could argue, there simply is 
no democratic deficit in security politics. Second, even if there was a democratic deficit, one may 
still question whether we should bother about it. After all, there has been a long and eminent 
tradition to measure foreign, security and defense politics against a lower standard of democratic 
accountability in most democracies because an effective security policy seemed to require a higher 
degree of secrecy and flexibility than other policies. 
 
In this paper, I argue that both claims are flawed. In the next section, I will argue that the 
Europeanization of security and defense politics does lead to a democratic deficit because the 
growing integration of military forces increases the pressure on reluctant member states to contribute 
to military missions even in the absence of majority support at home. In the third section, I will draw 
on recent debates in peace and conflict research and point out that a democratic deficit in European 
security and defense politics is not only worrying for its own sake but also because a growing body 
of literature regards the democratic control of security and defense politics as the best guarantee to 
maintain peaceful and cooperative relations with other states. I will conclude with a few thoughts on 
how the democratic deficit in security and defense politics could be mitigated. 
 
                                                 
 
2 Cf. among many others Weiler et al. 1995; Moravcsik 2002; Føllesdal/Hix 2006. 
 
 
22.  The democratic deficit in European Security and Defense Politics 
 
2.1  The establishment of a European Security and Defense Policy 
 
The establishment of autonomous European military capabilities only began in the late 1990s but has 
proceeded at a remarkable pace ever since. The embarrassing failure to prevent war on the Balkans 
had boosted calls for a military arm in the EU’s crisis management since the early 1990s. It took 
another crisis in Kosovo and a change of government in Britain, however, to launch a European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The EU members pledged to become able to deploy up to 
60.000 troops within 60 days for peace-keping and peace-enforcement missions (“Helsinki Headline 
Goal”). Only a few years later, they added the ambition to be able to deploy battalion-sized 
“battlegroups” within only ten days (“Headline Goal 2010”, cf. Lindstrom 2007). 
 
Based on a broad consensus to keep the EU’s supranational institutions at bay, the institutional 
dimension of ESDP caused few problems. The member states upgraded the Political Committee 
(now Political and Security Committee (PSC)) to a permanent institution at ambassadors’ level and 
placed a Military Committee (MC) and a Military Staff (MS) at their disposal. In 2004, a European 
Defense Agency was added to identify and manage joint armaments projects. In the event of a crisis, 
the foreign ministers in the Council would decide unanimously on whether to launch a military 
mission.
3
 
The achievement of the military headline goals posed a greater challenge because most EU states had 
made only little progress in adapting their militaries to the post-cold war agenda. Many member 
states still commanded huge numbers of tanks and troops (often conscripts) but were short of 
personel for demanding peace support missions and the means to transport and equip them. Given 
the concomitant decrease in defense spending since the end of the cold war, Europeanization seemed 
a promising way to spend shrinking budgets more efficiently.
4 Overcoming wasteful double and 
triple development and production of armaments as well as parallel military infrastructures and 
command and control systems has thus been a key target of ESDP. 
 
In enhancing efficiency, the integration of forces plays a key role, especially since governments 
hesitate to abolish barriers to trade in armaments and defense equipment. In the military realm, 
integration refers to the deliberate creation of interdependent relations among the armed forces of the 
member states. Governments may agree on varying degrees of military integration: At the minimalist 
end of the spectrum, they may merely coordinate force levels and structures with a view to a joint 
headline goal. Such a low degree of integration does not impact on a state’s capacity to deploy its 
armed forces unilaterally. At the maximalist end, governments may come close to establishing a 
supranational army replacing national armed forces. In this case, a state is entirely bereft of any 
unilateral military capacity. Inbetween these extreme points, governments may agree to varying 
degrees of common procurement, role specialization and coordination of their armed forces. For 
example, the Helsinki Headline Goal reinforced efforts to define common standards for equipment 
and to address capability gaps (such as long-range airlift) jointly. Moreover, EU members reported 
what troops they could make available for the peace support tasks envisioned at Helsinki. Thus, the 
Helsinki Headline Goal only requires a limited degree of integration. In contrast, the ambition to 
                                                 
 
3 Denmark opted out of ESDP and does therefore not participate in military crisis management. Set-up and functioning of 
the institutions are described in Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002). 
4 An often quoted figure was that European NATO members only obtained 10% of US capabilities although they spend 
about 60% of the US defense expenditure (Yost 2000: 99). 
 
 
3launch battalion-sized force packages within only ten days necessitates a higher level of integration. 
The short time horizon in particular is not compatible with the kind of force generation process 
frequently used for peacekeeping purposes. In order to ensure a rapid response capacity, EU 
governments have not only to indicate what troops they may contribute. They also have agreed on a 
binding schedule assigning six-months periods of training, high-readiness (“standby”) and stand-
down to a limited number of battlegroups. In the same vein, the short-time horizon does not allow for 
the ad-hoc composition of member state contributions. Instead, governments have either committed 
specific national or multinational forces. Such a “battlegroup roster” indicates a rather high degree of 
integration because member states significantly limit their unilateral freedom of manoeuvre for the 
sake of a European one.  
 
Even though no battlegroup has thus far been sent on a mission, the EU has carried out a remarkable 
number of military operations. The deployment of some 7.000 troops to Bosnia in December 2004 
(“EUFOR-Althea”) is particularly worth highlighting. One decade after a humiliating diplomatic 
failure in the face of the Bosnian war, the EU is now using the entire foreign policy tool kit including 
armed forces. 
 
 
2.2  The meaning of democracy in security and defense politics 
 
In order to assess whether there is a democratic deficit in ESDP, we have to make clear what 
‘democratic control’ refers to in the context of security and defense politics. This is everything but a 
trivial endeavor as ‘democracy’ means different things to different people, especially in the realm of 
security and defense politics.
5 In the following paragraphs, I will argue that the parliamentary control 
of deployment decisions is a key aspect of democratic control and may therefore serve as a proxy for 
the problem at large.  
 
To be sure, security and defense politics impacts on citizens’ lives in many ways: recruitment policy 
determines how much (if any) time young men must spend as conscripts, and the defense budget 
influences how much the government can dedicate to social policy, etc. The most tremendous 
impact, however, results from decisions on the actual deployment of troops in military missions 
because, in addition to their political and fiscal repercussions, citizens’ lives are then put at risk. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the importance of deployment decisions has grown because ‘peace 
support operations’ have become more common as a number of violent conflicts have increased the 
demand for such missions. At the same time, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has been 
blocked less frequently by one of the veto powers. In 2003, the then fifteen member states of the EU 
had deployed some 55,000 troops in international peace support operations (Giegerich and Wallace 
2004: 169). From the perspective of democratic control, deployment decisions can therefore be 
regarded as the most important aspect of contemporary security and defense policy. 
 
For governmental decision-making concerning the use of force, parliaments are considered “the 
central locus of accountability” (Hänggi 2004: 11). As elected representatives of the people, the 
articulation of popular interests and concerns has been a prominent task of members of parliament. 
Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi have distinguished three dimensions of parliamentary power in 
security and defense politics: ‘authority’ refers to ‘the power which Parliament uses to hold 
                                                 
 
5 A more comprehensive discussion of the manifold aspects of democratic control in security and defense politics can be 
found in Wagner 2005. 
 
 
4government accountable’ and which is ‘derived from the constitutional and legal framework as well 
as customary practices’. ‘Ability’ denotes the resources such as specialized committees, budget and 
staff which are necessary to make efficient use of the authority conferred upon parliament. Finally, 
‘attitude’ refers to the ‘willingness to hold the executive to account’ which, among other things, 
depends on the extent to which legislative–executive relations are characterized by party discipline 
(all quotes from Born 2004: 209–11). Although each of these factors has had an influence on the 
effectiveness of parliamentary accountability, Born and Hänggi conclude that ‘the strongest means of 
parliamentary oversight by far is …. the constitutional or legal right to approve or reject such use of 
force’ (Hänggi 2004:14). In contrast, budget and staff are certainly indispensable to make use of 
legal authority but they reflect rather than cause legal powers. Therefore, in discussing the 
democratic control of security and defense policy, this paper focuses on parliament’s control of 
deployment decisions. 
 
2.3  ESDP and the Weakening of Parliamentary Control 
 
In this section, I want to show how exactly the Europeanization of security and defense politics 
generates a democratic deficit. Because parliamentary control of deployment decisions has been 
identified as a suitable proxy for democratic control in the previous section, I will demonstrate in 
particular how effective parliamentary control is made more difficult by transferring decision-
making from the national to the European level.  
 
The causal mechanisms linking Europeanization to the emergence of a democratic deficit in security 
and defense politics are only partially familiar from the study of common market governance. Most 
obviously, the democratic deficit in security and defense politics does not result from an outvoting of 
governments in the Council because the treaties do not allow Qualified Majority Voting for decisions 
having military or defense implications.
6 Neither does the democratic deficit stem from the 
delegation of authority to supranational institutions such as the Commission or the European Central 
Bank which have been an obvious target of criticism in this respect. Indeed, as far as formal 
decision-making rules are concerned, the Europeanization of security and defense politics has left 
national systems of parliamentary control intact.  
 
The work of Andrew Moravcsik and Klaus Dieter Wolf helps to identify those causal mechanisms 
that are at play even if decisions are taken unanimously and supranational institutions are only 
involved at the fringes. Both Moravcsik and Wolf have pointed to a “dark side of intergovernmental 
cooperation” (Wolf 1999: 334), namely that “international cooperation tends to redistribute domestic 
political resources toward executives” (Moravcsik 1994: 7). Andrew Moravcsik has suggested four 
causal mechanisms that cause a loss of control over the executive. In the realm of ESDP they can be 
found to varying degrees.  
 
Most importantly, Moravcsik argues that once international agreement has been reached, it “may be 
costly, sometimes prohibitively so, for national parliaments, publics or officials to reject, amend or 
block ratification of and compliance with decisions reached by national executives in international 
for a” (Moravcsik 1994: 11). For military deployments, this effect is further exacerbated by the fact 
that even the ministers in the Council can no longer amend agreements previously reached between 
the conflicting parties or within the UN Security Council which form the bases of the military 
mission. Traditionally, states may still decide to refrain from participation or may add caveats as to 
                                                 
 
6 Cf. the explicit wording in Art. 23 (2) TEU-N. 
 
 
5their individual contributions. Precisely these options to bring a country’s contribution in line with 
domestic preferences, however, are increasingly qualified by the integration of forces and role 
specialization. The battle group concept, for example, implies that in the event of a decision to 
launch a military mission, the battle group currently on stand-by has to be sent abroad lest the EU 
refrains from intervening at all. If forces have been integrated, any state’s decision against its 
participation in a mission de facto frustrates the entire deployment because other states’ forces 
cannot work effectively without the missing state’s contribution. As a consequence, states whose 
forces have been integrated on an international level may come under heavy peer pressure from those 
states that advocate the use of joint forces. The same effect results from any elaborate scheme of role 
specialization: if capabilities are no longer held by all member states but by only a few or even a 
single one, the menu of choice for the member state concerned has been severely transformed: 
instead of deciding about its country’s participation in a particular military mission, it de facto bears 
the burden of deciding about whether the EU may become involved at all since no other member 
state could replace the capability under consideration.  
 
Equally important is another causal mechanism identified by Moravcsik according to which 
executives can impose an initial ideological ‘frame’ on an issue which is difficult for domestic 
groups to challenge. With a view to military missions, it is highly important whether an intervention 
is framed as a “humanitarian intervention” or as a self-interested campaign. Although the initial 
framing may be questioned by domestic audiences, the executive has a large influence on the initial 
parameters. 
 
In addition, Moravcsik holds that international co-operation enhances the executive’s control over 
the domestic agenda because the international agenda has been ‘cartelized’ between national leaders. 
In the realm of security and defense, this effect seems rather weak because the agenda is set in large 
parts by developments outside the EU and the control of member governments (cf. Wagner 2003). 
As a general rule, the possible deployment of armed forces will be discussed whenever an 
international conflict escalates and receives wide media coverage. However, governments can still 
decide on whether to have the EU, NATO, or the UN deal with a crisis.  
 
Finally, Moravcsik argues that international co-operation gives executives privileged access to 
information about the political constraints of other governments and about the technical 
consequences of alternative policies.  
 
Klaus Dieter Wolf’s notion that executives may deliberately use international cooperation to gain 
leverage over domestic actors finds support in an empirical study by Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
(2004). If the Europeanization of security politics is designed to enhance the executive’s room of 
manouevre, Koenig-Archibugi argues, we should expect most support for a supranational security 
policy from those member governments whose freedom of action is most highly circumscribed 
domestically. Indeed, this new raison d’État-hypothesis is confirmed in a regression analysis. 
 
 
2.4  Case study illustration: Germany and AWACS 
 
Even though the EU has assumed responsibility for a growing number of military missions, the 
Council has not yet made a decision to deploy a battlegroup (after all, the battlegroups reached full 
operational capability only in January 2007). As a consequence, one could not yet observe how the 
ambitious aim to have two battlegroups available and to send one of them on a mission within only 
days works in practice and how the battlegroups’ high level of integration conflicts with 
 
 
6parliamentary control in the contributing states. The case of Germany’s participation in NATO’s 
highly integrated AWACS fleet, however, may illustrate empirically the kind of tensions that any 
democracy experiences if it has committed troops to integrated military forces. Although different 
from the EU in some respects, NATO’s integrated AWACS fleet is sufficiently similar to the EU’s 
integrated battlegroups to demonstrate what EU members are likely to experience once they decide 
to use in practice what they have successfully copied from NATO.
7  
 
Germany is particularly suited to illustrate the conflicting demands of military integration and 
parliamentary control. As a consequence of two world wars and the atrocities of the Wehrmacht, 
Germany has been a champion of both multilateralism and antimilitarism (among many others, see 
Anderson and Goodman 1993; Berger 1998). Since the fierce debate over rearmament in the 1950s, a 
reluctance to use military force and a commitment to multilateralism became prime pillars of post-
war German security policy. However, since the end of the Cold War and the growing number of 
peace support operations out of area, tensions between these two principles have mounted.  
 
Right after the Cold War, a participation of the Bundeswehr in out of area missions was widely 
opposed in Germany. Indeed, the German government refrained from sending the Bundeswehr to the 
Persian Gulf in 1990–91. At the time of the Gulf crisis of 1990–91, German politicians were eager to 
demonstrate the country’s peacefulness and were ‘surprised that the USA and Israel, among others, 
condemned Germany for not contributing militarily against Iraq’ (Philippi 2001: 51). German 
decision-makers had to realize that its NATO partners now expected Germany as an ally to make a 
substantial contribution to non-article 5 operations (Baumann 2001: 166). Moreover, they realized 
that ‘similar behaviour in a future conflict would probably result in a crisis with its major allies’ 
(Philippi 2001: 51). From then on, German governments aimed at overcoming the antimilitarist 
culture as an obstacle to the deployment of the Bundeswehr out of area. For this purpose, ‘reliability 
as an ally’ and ‘alliance solidarity’ became prominent arguments in the German debate over out of 
area missions (cf. Schwab-Trapp 2002). These arguments were buttressed by references to integrated 
force structures of which the Bundeswehr had been part. References to Germany’s participation in 
NATO’s AWACS illustrate this point: AWACS has been designed to recognize enemy aircraft over 
a given territory, most importantly in the event of an attack (defensive function). In addition, it may 
help to identify and select targets for air strikes (offensive function). In 1993, NATO offered its 
AWACS fleet to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia which the UN Security Council had agreed on. 
The German government’s decision not to withdraw Bundeswehr personnel from AWACS met 
considerable criticism from the opposition and even from within the governing coalition. Thus, in 
early 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) had to give a preliminary ruling on whether the 
participation of the Bundeswehr violated the German constitution as the opposition argued. With a 
narrow margin of 5:3 votes, the FCC endorsed the government’s decision to have the Bundeswehr 
participate in AWACS’s mission over Bosnia. Concerns about alliance solidarity and reliability 
played a decisive role in the judgment. The Court noted that the Bundeswehr made up for around 30 
per cent of AWACS’s personnel. As a consequence, a withdrawal of German soldiers at the very 
moment of this mission would endanger the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. 
Furthermore, “allies and European neighbours would inevitably lose trust in German policy; the 
resulting damage would be irreparable.’
8
  Thus, the fact that the Bundeswehr participated in an 
                                                 
 
7 The most important difference between NATO and the EU concerns the dominant role of the US which retains a fully-
fledged unilateral military capability. At the same time, however, both NATO and the EU have developed a strong sense 
of common identity and solidarity (Risse-Kappen 1995a; Risse 2001; Sjursen 2004) which lays the foundation for the 
integration of military forces.  
8 BverfG E vol. 88, 173, II, p.183, author’s translation. 
 
 
7integrated military structure played a decisive role in legitimizing Germany’s first combat (in 
contrast to humanitarian or peace-keeping) mission out of area. Since then, the scope of Germany’s 
contribution to out of area missions has grown continually (cf. for an overview Baumann and 
Hellmann 2001). In the main judgment of July 1994, the FCC affirmed the principle that any 
deployment of the Bundeswehr must obtain parliamentary approval in advance. According to the 
FCC, the use of the armed forces is not within the executive’s sole discretion but as a ‘parliamentary 
army’ part of the democratic constitutional order. However, the principle of advance parliamentary 
approval is circumscribed in two cases: ‘The participation of the Bundestag in a specific decision to 
deploy troops that constitutional law requires must not compromise Germany’s ability to defend 
itself (Wehrfähigkeit) and to make alliance commitments (Bündnisfähigkeit)’ (author’s translation). 
Since the FCC’s ruling, the Bundestag has dealt with more than thirty deployments of the 
Bundeswehr (including the prolongation and extension of missions) (Meyer 2004: 19–20). However, 
this practice has again come under pressure since NATO’s Prague summit decided to set up a 
multinational ‘Response Force’ that could be deployed for the most demanding peace support 
missions within a few days. The deployment of the NATO Response Force (NRF) was simulated at 
an informal NATO summit in Colorado Springs in October 2003. It soon became clear that a rapid 
deployment could be endangered by the required advance approval of the German parliament. As 
with AWACS, German troops might play an essential role in the NRF. In contrast to AWACS, 
however, even a belated ‘green light’ would possibly cause problems. As a consequence, German 
Defence Minister Struck immediately launched a debate about a reform of Germany’s parliamentary 
proviso. Struck’s suggestion was supported by his American colleague, Donald Rumsfeld, who 
urged NATO members ‘to bring NATO’s decision-making structures up to date so that NATO 
military commanders can take decisive action against fast-moving threats in the 21st century’.
9 To be 
sure, the conflict between the democratic control of the armed forces and the demands of alliance 
politics is nowhere likely to be as intense as in Germany where both demanding standards of 
parliamentary control and multinational integration were designed to prevent a resurgence of 
militarism. However, similar though possibly less intense conflicts are likely to occur in other states 
with traditionally high levels of parliamentary control as well. Moreover, the EU might become the 
prime forum for such conflicts to the extent that the ESDP steps into NATO’s footprints. In 
particular, the project of EU ‘battle groups’, i.e. small, integrated multinational forces to be deployed 
at short notice, is likely to result in conflicts very similar to those over the NRF.  
 
 
3.  Why bother? The “democratic turn” research in peace and conflict research 
 
Even if one accepts the analysis in the previous section that there is an emerging democratic deficit 
in European security and defense politics one may still question whether this warrants particular 
concern. Students of European governance or democratic theory may argue that a democratic deficit 
in this issue area is indeed less troubling than in other issue areas because the commonly accepted 
standard of democratic control in security and defense politics has been low anyway. Historical 
legacies and functional requirements have both served as explanations - and justifications - for a 
rather low standard of democratic control. According to the historical argument, the level of 
democratic control is lower because security and defense politics has been a reserve of the executive. 
According to the functional argument, democratic control of security and defense policy has to be 
lower because an effective policy requires secrecy and flexibility.  
                                                 
 
9  US Department of Defense, News Transcript, Press Conference with Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and NATO 
Secretary-General Lord Robertson; Wednesday, 8 October 2003. 
 
 
8 
In this section I will draw on a growing body of literature in peace and conflict research to make the 
opposite claim, namely that a democratic deficit in security and defense politics is rather troubling. 
In contrast to students of European governance or democratic theory, students of peace and conflict 
research are not only concerned with the democratic legitimacy of politics per se. Over the last two 
decades or so, they have also devoted increasing attention to the effects of democratic governance on 
a wide range of security policies and, ultimately, on the prospects of peace.  
 
Over the last two decades or so, there has been a “democratic turn” in peace and conflict research, 
i.e. the peculiar impact of democratic governance on a wide range of security issues has attracted 
more and more attention. Although the notion that democracy is a force for good has a long and 
eminent tradition, peace and conflict research has hardly pursued this line of thinking until Michael 
Doyle’s famous piece on “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” (Doyle 1983).
10 Doyle’s 
article triggered the debate on the so-called ‘democratic peace’ which in turn gave rise to what John 
Owen called a “democratic distinctiveness programme” (Owen 2004: 605). Two and a half decades 
after the publication of Doyle’s article, democracy has become the prime candidate for developing 
explanations for a growing number of puzzles in peace and conflict research. In the following 
paragraphs I will give an overview of the emergence and development of the “democratic 
distinctiveness programme”. Since the story of the democratic peace debate has been told many 
times before (cf., among many others, Chan 1997; Owen 2004), I will focus on subsequent research 
linking democracy to a wide range of security-related policies. 
 
The starting point of the “democratic distinctiveness programme” is the finding that democracies 
have rarely if ever waged war against each other.
11 This finding introduced democracy as a cause of 
peace even though it only applied to the limited realm of relations between established 
democracies.
12 The subsequent success story of the democratic peace resulted from its defense 
against a large number of theoretical, methodological and empirical critiques from various 
viewpoints and from the significance of this debate for the realism/liberalism debate more broadly. 
Criticism of the democratic peace led to a refinement of statistical methods (cf. Spiro 1994, Russett 
1995), the incorporation of control variables (cf. Bremer 1992; Maoz/Russett 1993) and a 
proliferation of case studies (most prominently Owen 1994 and 1997). 
 
Democratic institutions have played a key role in developing an explanation for the democratic 
peace. Following Kant, democratic institutions have been regarded as making government policy 
responsive and accountable to a citizenry which is pictured as eager to preserve their lives and 
property and thus to abhor war.
13 In a more formal vocabulary, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James 
                                                 
 
10 A notable exception is Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1972; 1981) whose influence has been limited to the German-speaking 
political science community. 
11 The qualification „rarely“ served to accommodate a number of contested cases such as democratic Finland in World 
War II (fighting against the Soviet Union and, by implication, against the Western allies as well) or the war of 1812 
between the USA and a United Kingdom whose democratic quality has been questioned due to limited suffrage and vast 
executive freedom on foreign affairs. 
12 The related claim that democracies are less war-prone in general experienced a little renaissance in the late 1990s (cf. 
Benoit 1996) but did not carry the end of the day (for an overview cf. Macmillan 2003).  
13 An alternative account has emphasised democratic norms and culture instead of democratic institutions (cf. Doyle 
1983; Russett 1993; Maoz/Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Weart 1998). From this perspective, decision-makers “will try to 
follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterise their domestic political 
processes” (Russett 1993: 35). Since democracies are characterised by peaceful conflict resolution, they will prefer 
negotiation over the use of force in international politics as well. This pacifist preference, however, only translates into 
 
 
9Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith have argued that democracies are characterized by 
large “selectorates” (the proportion of society selecting the leadership). Because political leaders’ 
staying in power thus depends on a broad winning colation, they are better off providing public 
goods (such as peace and economic growth) instead of private goods (for an outline of the 
“selectorate theory” cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). An early wave of institutionalist theorizing 
also argued that “institutional constraints - a structure of division of powers, checks and balances - 
would make it difficult for democratic leaders to move their countries into war” (Russett 1003: 38). 
More recently, scholars have de-emphasized the constraining effects of domestic institutions and 
have instead highlighted that elections, open political competition and free media improve a 
government’s ability to send credible signals of its resolve (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1999). 
 
The success of the democratic peace inspired two closely interwoven developments in peace and 
conflict research. First, because Immanuel Kant was widely celebrated as the intellectual godfather 
of the democratic peace, scholars re-examined interdependence and international institutions as 
further conditions of peace as suggested in Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” and thus re-vitalized two further 
traditions of liberal theorizing. Second, students of peace and conflict added more and more items to 
the list of what distinguishes democracies from other regimes in international (security) politics. 
These two developments were closely interwoven because the renaissance of commercial peace- and 
institutional peace-studies soon made a “democratic turn”, i.e. democracy was identified as a 
favorable context condition. I will address these two developments in turn. 
 
The commercial peace thesis has a long and well-known tradition
14 but did not figure prominently 
until the 1990s when it gained momentum from the renaissance of Kantian thinking following the 
democratic peace debate. Although several studies found support for the thesis that economically 
significant trade between states reduces the risk of armed conflict between them (e.g. Polachek 1980; 
Russett/Oneal 1997), a large number of scholars reported remaining doubts because the findings 
were vulnerable to changes in concepts, data measurement or time periods studied (Mansfiel/Pollins 
2003: 21). As a consequence, scholars called for the identification of context conditions for the 
commercial peace (cf. Schneider/Barbieri/Gleditsch 2003).  
 
Among the context conditions suggested are the level of economic development (cf. Hegre 2003), 
the institutionalization of trade relations (cf. Mansfield/Pevehouse 2003) and – most significant in 
the context of this paper – the regime type of the states engaged in trade. Christopher Gelpi and 
Joseph Grieco in particular have argued that democracies “react to greater trade integration with a 
reduced propensity to initiate militarized disputes with their partners” (Gelpi/Grieco 2003: 2). 
Drawing on the selectorate theory, Gelpi/Grieco argue that democratic institutions entail incentives 
for leaders to provide public goods whereas for leaders in non-democracies it often appears rational 
to provide private benefits to members of a small winning coalition. Following the standard 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
peaceful relations with other democracies. In conflicts with non-democracies, democracies are forced to resort to realist 
strategies lest they risk being attack (Risse-Kappen 1995b). Critics claim that the normative/cultural model fails to 
account for the numerous threats made by one democracy against another (Layne 1994: 13) as well as for colonial wars 
against states “that were about subjugation rather than self-protection” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Rosato 2003: 
588). 
14 The works of Adam Smith, Richard Cobden, Norman Angell and Joseph Schumpeter may be regarded as milestones in 
that tradition (for an overview cf. Doyle 1997: 230-250). 
 
 
10economic argument about the effects of trade, Gelpi/Grieco maintain that leaders in democracies 
have particularly strong incentives to seek growth by fostering trade. Moreover, once a state has 
established high levels of trade with another country, democratic leaders can be expected to be 
vulnerable to possible interruptions of trade flows because missed growth opportunities may damage 
their prospects of being re-elected. As a consequence, democracies but not other regime types are 
expected to avoid armed conflict with states to which they have close economic relations. 
Gelpi/Grieco find robust support for this expectation for the period 1950-1992. 
 
The commercial peace can also be expected to be particularly strong among democracies because 
democracies tend to trade disproportionately among themselves. Harry Bliss and Bruce Russett list 
several reasons for especially high levels of trade among democracies (cf. Bliss/Russett 1998: 
1128f.): First of all, leaders in democracies “need be less concerned that a democratic trading partner 
will use gains from trade to endanger their security than when their country trades with a 
nondemocracy”; furthermore, firms will “prefer to trade with those in states with whom relations are 
reliably peaceful” and where the rule of law precludes expropriations. Finally, shared norms “help 
reduce trade interference from embargoes and boycotts”. Further empirical studies found that 
democracies have a higher probability to conclude preferential trade agreements   
Mansfield/Milner/Rosendorff (2000; 2002) and that democratization in developing countries is 
associated with trade liberalization (Milner/Kubota 2005). 
 
While there have always been countless studies on the contribution of a particular international 
institution to the management of a particular conflict, early large-n studies failed to show any 
significant effect of membership in international institutions on the level of conflict between states.
15 
Again, the renaissance of Kantian thinking in the aftermath of the democratic peace debate re-
initiated the systematic analysis of the “institutional peace”. Notwithstanding a much later take-off 
than the commercial peace-debate, the courses of the two debates have shown striking similarities: 
Whereas several studies found evidence in support of an institutional peace, others failed to do so 
suggesting that the institutional peace thesis is vulnerable to changes in specification and 
measurement.
16 The subsequent search for context conditions again led to a “democratic turn”, i.e. 
the regime type of the member states was identified as an important qualification of the institutional 
peace thesis. 
 
Democracies have been considered to have both particular inclinations and capacities to establish 
and maintain international institutions. To a large extent, explanations for these particular features of 
democracies’ foreign policies have drawn on causal mechanisms familiar from explanations for the 
democratic peace and the commercial peace. For example, the selectorate theory holds that 
democracies tend to establish and maintain international institutions for the same reasons that they 
tend to avoid costly wars or promote trade: because democratic leaders face incentives to provide 
public goods, they will establish and maintain international institutions which help to do so. From a 
constructivist point of view, in contrast, democracies tend to cooperate among themselves for the 
same reason they maintain peaceful relations and high levels of trade: A common set of values 
fosters trust and overcomes otherwise prominent relative gains concerns etc.  
 
                                                 
 
15 Cf. especially Singer/Wallace 1970. This corresponded to a reading of Kant according to which his “federation of free 
states” is rather a result of than a cause for peace (cf. Moravcsik 1996). 
16 Russett/Oneal/Davies 1998, Oneal/Russett/Berbaum 2003 found that there is a significant effect of international 
institutions on peace whereas Bennett/Stam 2004 and Gartzke/Li/Boehmer 2001 found no supporting evidence. 
 
 
11Democracies are not only considered to be especially interested in international cooperation; they are 
also regarded to be particularly capable to establish and maintain international institutions. Again, 
the causal mechanisms that make democracies “reliable partners” (Lipson 2003) are familiar from 
the democratic peace. Most importantly, the checks and balances, transparency and openness 
characteristic of decision-making in democracies also contribute to their capability to establish and 
maintain international institutions (Ikenberry 2001). Because entering into an international 
commitment requires the consent of parliaments, courts, interest groups etc., defection becomes less 
likely once such consent has been achieved (Cowhey 1993; Martin 2000).
17 Moreover, free media 
and a vital civil society make the detection of defection likely which in turn helps to mitigate 
problems of monitoring characteristic of collective action problems (cf. Zangl 1999). From a 
constructivist perspective, one may add that democracies’ esteem for the rule of law extends to the 
honouring of international (legal) commitments (Gaubatz 1996).  
 
In another analogy to commercial peace-research, scholars of the institutional-peace have argued that 
democracies cooperate disproportionately among themselves and that “interdemocratic institutions” 
(i.e. international institutions composed of democracies) are particularly effective in reaping the 
pacifying effects of cooperation (Hasenclever/Weiffen 2006).  
 
Empirical studies found evidence that „free states belonged on average to more IGOs than those that 
were partly free or unfree” (Shanks et al. 1996: 609), that democratizing states join IOs more 
frequently than other countries (Mansfield/Pevehouse 2006), that democratic states are less likely to 
violate alliance commitments (Leeds (2003) and that IGOs have the more pacifying effects the more 
democratic their member states are (Pevehouse/Russett 2006). 
 
As these brief reviews of the state-of-the-art on the commercial and institutional peace show, both 
debates have made a “democratic turn” as democracy has been identified as a crucial context 
condition. Thus, these studies have not only revitalized the debates on trade, international institutions 
and peace but have also added to the notion of “democratic distinctiveness” more broadly.  
 
The “democratic turn” in peace and conflict studies is further illustrated by the fact that critics 
frequently doubt the specific substance of but not the democratic distinctiveness per se. For example, 
Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) argue that the peculiarities of democratic governance make 
democracies less reliable allies thereby accepting the distinct impact of democratic decision-making 
as a new common ground.   
 
The treatment of “democratic violence” has developed along similar lines. To be sure, proponents of 
the democratic peace never claimed that democracies generally refrain from the use of military 
force.
18 With the notable exception of Michael Doyle, however, proponents of the democratic peace 
hardly analyzed the violence emanating from democratic states in terms of its democratic 
distinctiveness. If “democratic violence” surfaced at all, it was either presented as a challenge to the 
democratic peace proposition or treated as an un-democratic contaminant and pre-democratic relict.
19 
                                                 
 
17 In the terminology suggested by James Fearon, the “audience costs” of defection are higher in democracies than in 
other regimes. 
18 Even the so called monadic version oft he democratic peace only claimed that democracies fight wars less frequently 
than other regimes but nevertheless do so regularly. 
19 David Forsythe’s study on covert action (1992), Mansfield’s and Snyder’s work on democratization and violence 
(1995 et passim) presented their work as a challenge to the democratic peace (in addition see Rosato 2003 and the vast 
 
 
12Only more recently has democracies’ use of force been treated as inherently democratic violence in 
the sense that the very same feature that are responsible for peace among democracies are to be held 
accountable for the specific use of force by democracies.
20 For example, the responsiveness and 
accountability of democratic leaders to the electorate has been used to explain why democracies tend 
to win the wars they fight (Reiter/Stam 2002), and why their armament policy aims at avoiding 
casualties (Schörnig 2007). 
 
Of course, research on the economic, power-related or cultural causes of war has not been replaced 
by the democratic distinctiveness agenda. Nevertheless, for almost any puzzle in peace and conflict 
research, the distinct difference of democratic governance has become an obvious point of departure. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The review of recent peace and conflict research demonstrates that a growing number of issues has 
been (re-)examined with a view to the distinct impact of democratic governance. Put differently, the 
conjecture that democracies somehow behave differently from other regime types has become an 
obvious starting point in addressing whatever puzzle in peace and conflict research one is interested 
in.  
 
Although there has been a growing consensus on the distinctiveness of democracies, the nature and 
the causes of this distinctiveness are still heavily contested. Despite a mounting number of studies, 
no finding can so far claim a similar degree of robustness as the democratic peace which triggered 
the democratic distinctiveness program in the first place. The better part of the evidence available, 
however, holds that democracies are indeed a force for good, i.e. they allow for higher degrees of 
interdependence (such as trade) and are better in establishing and maintaining international 
institutions, particularly among themselves.  
 
In the face of such a distinct record in international (security) politics, the European challenge to 
democratic control warrants concern. To be sure, the cumulative findings of democratic 
distinctiveness program hardly allow for the expectation that the further Europeanization of security 
and defense politics will yield unreliable and aggressive member states. Nevertheless, scholars of 
peace and conflict studies may well alert their colleagues in European Union studies that an 
emerging democratic deficit in security and defense policy may not merely be deplored for the loss 
of self-determination but may, albeit gradually, change the very substance of security policies.  
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